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Effective contracting for high operational performance in projects  
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study examines combinations of contract clauses in order to ascertain 
which combinations correlate to high operational performance.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – Two hypotheses were formulated from contracting 
theory and tested on data collected from 45 projects. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis was used and validated with multiple regression and simulation.  
 
Findings – The hypotheses were tested to determine whether combinations of classical, 
relational and/or associational contract clauses correlate to high operational 
performance. The results show that, whereas high operational performance correlates 
to combinations of relational and associational contract clauses, classical and relational 
clauses should not be combined.  
 
Originality/value – This study contributes to the theory of contractual incompleteness 
and complementarity, specifically in the context of project contracting. The analysis 
produced two theoretical implications: first, that better performing contracts are 
created when combining relational and associational contract clauses, and; second, that, 
in projects, relational and classical contract clauses are not complementary with regards 
to realising high operational performance.  
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Practical implications – The managerial implications of the findings include a more 
thorough understanding of the use of contract clauses and of which clauses managers 
should combine to achieve high operational performance.   
 
Research limitations/implications – Directions are proposed to guide future research 
in order to produce a more nuanced testing of contractual complementarity. 
 
Keywords – Classical and relational contracts, contract clauses, operational performance, 
projects  
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1. Introduction 
The motivation underpinning the theory of incomplete contracts (Hart 1995; Hart and 
Moore 1990; Grossman and Hart, 1986) is to understand the limitations of the contracts 
that fail because of bounded rationality in predicting opportunism in future 
contingencies, moral hazards, and contract writing, enforcing, and monitoring costs. 
The relevant literature mainly focuses upon two widely adopted types of contracts -
namely, classical and relational. While classical contracts establish the rules for discrete 
and simple, one-off transactions or exchanges, and are often used as tools for dealing 
with transactions at arm’s length; relational contracts approach the matter not merely 
as one-off transactions, but also as relationships so they use clauses with extra-
contractual relationship means (Kimel, 2007: 235-6). The extant literature and practice 
alike argue that both classical and relational contracts are incomplete (Howard et al., 
2018; Grandori, 2010; Williamson, 1999).  
To resolve the issue of incompleteness, some studies have explored whether 
the two types of contracts could be combined (e.g. Sumo et al., 2016; Wacker et al., 
2016; Hartmann et al., 2014; Kalkancı et al., 2014; Smith and King, 2009). However, 
these studies have not explored the combinations of contract clauses. Rather, some 
studies tried to explore how classical contracts can be combined with extra-contractual 
relational mechanisms such as trust, authority, or norms (Maylor and Turner, 2017; 
Caldwell and Howard, 2014; Lumineau and Malhotra, 2011; Weber and Mayer, 2011; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002), but they have not specified how relational and classical 
contract clauses can be combined. In response, other studies have put forward new 
types of contracts called “associational”, designed to help contracting parties to react 
to uncertainties (e.g., Grandori and Furlotti, 2006). To our knowledge, the issue of 
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contract clauses combination remains unanswered because no study has hitherto 
tested combinations of contract clauses (as emphasized by, for instance, Howard et al., 
2018; Hartmann et al., 2014; March et al., 2000). In other words, research needs to test 
the combinations of contracts, which amounts to testing the combinations of clauses.  
Contracts providing legal governance for projects are often formulated in 
environments involving highly complex relationships; environments in which time and 
cost pressures do not allow relational mechanisms to evolve (Broekhuis and Scholten, 
2018; Curlee and Gordon, 2011; Oltra et al., 2005). Thus, contract incompleteness and 
complementarity need to be investigated in project contracts in other ways (Howard et 
al., 2018; Sumo et al., 2016; Kalkancı et al., 2014; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014).  
Accordingly, the following research question was posed: What combination (or 
combinations) of contract clauses can lead to high operational performance in projects? 
Our approach involved the derivation of hypotheses focusing on combinations of 
contract clauses and then, the testing of each of these in relation to whether they could 
bring about high operational performance (OP). This type of analysis constitutes more 
than a technical study and more than just an example of the application of current 
theory. The theoretical and practical contributions of this work are important for those 
who theorize and handle inter-organizational relationships in complex and uncertain 
supply chains (MacCormack and Mishra, 2015), and in high-risk, high-variety operations 
such as projects (Davies and Brady, 2000).  
The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 45 case studies using fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) validated through multiple regression and 
simulation. This study offers the following theoretical contributions. First, findings show 
that high OP in projects is achieved by combinations of relational and associational 
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contract clauses. Second, that classical and relational clauses should not be combined. 
The results contribute to the theory of contractual incompleteness and 
complementarity, specifically in projects.  
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows. First, the review 
section provides an overview of the main issues in contractual incompleteness and 
complementarity and of the types of contract clauses linked to performance, the 
constructs and the hypotheses. The method section provides justification for the 
suitability of configuration analysis to the context and subject of the study, and a 
detailed protocol of the data collection and analysis involved. Finally, our findings are 
presented and the theoretical and managerial implications as further research 
opportunities are discussed.  
 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
In the first part of this section, the issues pertaining to incompleteness and 
complementarity in contracting are explained. In the second part, the literature on 
contract clauses is reviewed, the constructs are developed, and the hypotheses are 
derived. 
 
2.1 Contractual incompleteness and complementarity  
Since the late 1980s, there has been a considerable increase in studies addressing 
incompleteness in contract theory (Hart and Moore, 1990; Grossman and Hart, 1986;). 
The literature started exploring incompleteness from the following ideas, drawn from 
transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985), that insufficient contractual 
safeguards can result in inefficient levels of investment; that trading partners fear 
6 
 
opportunistic behaviors; and that the avoidance of inefficiencies and opportunism 
provide the boundaries of action. Contracts may exhibit two forms of incompleteness: 
discretion, meaning that they do not specify the parties' behaviors in sufficient detail; 
and rigidity, meaning that the parties' obligations are not sufficiently correlated to the 
external states or contingencies (Battigalli and Maggi, 2002). In the theory of 
incomplete contracts, the main concern is to investigate the limitations of those 
contracts that fail to specify contingencies and to set up safeguards guiding action 
involved in the transaction (Lewis and Roehrich, 2009; Hart 1995). The reason for such 
failures can be due to bounded rationality and incomplete information making it 
impossible to anticipate contingencies, therefore leading to difficulties in clarifying the 
appropriate actions to be taken by each contracting party. This often results in the 
wrong course of action being prescribed in the clauses and rising complexities in 
contract structures, with unnecessary clauses and increased writing, monitoring, and 
enforcing costs (MacLeod, 2000).  
In contrast to TCE, which seek to match contract structures to the characteristics 
of transactions, relational contract theory (RCT) espouses extra-contractual relational 
mechanisms (such as trust, authority, or norms) as being more efficient in constraining 
opportunism, while offering more flexibility and lowering set-up costs (MacNeil and 
Campbell, 2001; MacNeil, 1999). The logic behind relational contracting is that the 
existence of non-legal or social sanctions forces partners to fulfill their commitments 
(Lewis and Roehrich, 2009). In this way contractual incompleteness, transaction hazards, 
and opportunistic behavior can be controlled, which implies that relational contracting 
has complementary effects to classical contracts (Lumineau and Malhotra, 2011; Weber 
and Mayer, 2011; Susarla et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). However, RCT assumes 
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the existence of a prior relationship between partners. This may be the case in inter-
organizational supply chain environments in which partners have the time and make 
conscious investments to develop such relationships (Gil, 2009; Skaates et al., 2002). 
The extant literature considers this a ‘weak’ point of relational contracting, as the 
suitability of this assumption may not be verifiable in contexts in which temporary 
organizations have strict time and resource constraints and function on swift trust 
(Curlee and Gordon, 2011; Oltra et al., 2005; Davies and Brady, 2000). In terms of 
incompleteness, relational contracts can be less legally binding, because they contain 
more and weaker clauses that are neither enforceable nor observable by third parties 
(Furlotti, 2007; Klein-Woolthuis et al., 2005). This lack of specificity in relational clauses 
may also cause ambiguity and leave space for opportunistic behaviors (Luo, 2002). 
Thus, the safeguarding function of a relational contract may be less effective.  
In summary, both the classical and relational forms of contracting are found to 
be incomplete and more likely to be ineffective and highly complex, thus constraining 
operational flexibility whilst also leading to disputes and to trust deterioration (Faems 
et al., 2008). Due to the incompleteness of both classical and relational contracting and 
to the polarities that exist between them, they have been seen as potentially having 
complementary effects. Many studies have called for the discovery of ways to combine 
them to achieve better performance (e.g. Howard et al., 2018; Sumo et al., 2016; 
Kalkancı et al., 2014; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014).  
The technical definition of complementarity (Ennen and Richter, 2010: 208-9; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1995: 181), states that “doing more of one element encourages 
the increase of another”; conversely, Poppo and Zenger (2002: 713) proposed that “the 
combination of the two should generate higher performance than either [governance 
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mechanism] in isolation”. Based on this definition, studies investigated if classical 
contracts could make transactions efficient when combined with extra-contractual 
relational mechanisms such as trust (Mayer and Teece, 2008; Williamson, 1985). 
However, these studies did not test classical contract clauses with relational or other 
types of contract clauses. Therefore, although extant theory suggests that the 
combination of classical and relational contracts can reduce incompleteness, the 
grounds for testing this argument through an empirical model have not been laid.  
 
2.2 Combining contract types  
There are three contract types in the literature: classical, relational, and associational 
(Appendix 1). The differences between them are found in the focus of their regulation, 
which is, respectively, either the transaction process (classical and relational), or the 
decision-making process (associational). The contract structures are also different 
(Appendix 1): classical contracts are segmented according to the parts of the 
transaction process; relational contracts according to the relationships’ life cycles. 
associational contracts are based upon the “core” of the decision and resource rights 
and the “belt” sections of a mix of contingency clauses (Grandori, 2010: 153, 359; 
Grandori and Furlotti, 2009: 85-86; Kimel, 2007: 236).   
Although several issues have been raised in the literature regarding the 
combination of contracts, the main ones are diversity and uncertainty within the 
transaction. The extant theory holds that the complementary use of contracts may 
differ due to these transactional characteristics (Mallewigt et al., 2012; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Uzzi, 1997). Contingency factors influence transactions and often lead to 
more customized versions of a contract type (Ng and Nudurupati, 2010). This 
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customization is based on the premise that the terms of an agreement can be 
presented in varied ways (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) - from informal promises to 
formalized detailed clauses - to fit practice (Schepker et al., 2014). This issue is relevant 
to this study because projects are distinctively characterized by high levels of risk, 
difficulty in establishing relational mechanisms, and high levels of change and 
contingency (Gil, 2009; Skaates et al., 2002). When uncertainty is high and relationship 
lifecycles are short, contracts can become complex and detailed. Therefore, project 
contracts often inhibit the flexibility that is required by projects more than by other 
operational forms. Any extra-contractual mechanisms are weak because of the short 
project relationship lifecycles, so combining contract clauses is the only way to test 
complementarity (Mellewigt, et al., 2012). In the next section, we review the clauses and 
discuss their combination.  
 
2.3 Combining contract clauses  
Contract clauses are specific provisions that clearly define the duties, rights, and 
privileges possessed by each partner under the contract terms. Each clause also 
addresses a specific aspect (such as quality, delivery time, and/or specifications) related 
to the transaction and may address a procedure and its standards. In order to develop 
a hypothetical model suited to test the idea of combining classical and relational 
contract clauses, the clauses used in the aforementioned three contract types need to 
be reviewed (section 2.4) to derive hypotheses stating how such clauses could 
complement each other to drive high OP. This was done by reviewing those studies 
that had identified and categorized the clauses (see Table 1) found in classical, 
relational, and associational contracts.  
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<Please insert Table 1 here> 
Contract clauses can be assessed by reading the contract document that 
formalizes the regulations, processes, and policies that guide the relationship. Different 
clauses serve different purposes and hence can be classified in different ways. Some 
studies have investigated the contract clauses that are prevalent in a specific industry 
(Lui and Ngo 2004). They focused on price, cost, or performance (Essig et al., 2016; 
Caldwell and Howard, 2014). Other studies have created sets of contract clauses 
according to their specific functions and to the perspective from which they originate. 
For instance, Mellewigt et al. (2012) classified clauses found in alliance contracts, calling 
them safeguarding, coordination, and contingency-adaptability. Luo (2002) classified a 
task-specificity set, clarifying the partners’ roles and responsibilities, and a contingency-
adaptability set, specifying action plans for the handling of unanticipated contingencies. 
Some studies have split individual sets into various sub-sets for more nuanced 
contractual functions (e g. Reuer and Ariño, 2007). Others have compared sub-sets of 
contract clauses and measured them in isolation to one another (e.g., the 24 clauses 
pertaining to four contractual functions measured independently in Anderson and 
Dekker, 2005; the three sub-sets-namely, contract detail, monitoring, and penalties in 
Ryall and Sampson, 2009; and the task description and contingency planning clauses in 
Argyres et al., 2007). Grouping contract clauses into sets is an accepted way of 
categorizing them, which also helps in operationalizing their large numbers.  
The extant contracting literature offers very limited insights into the relationship 
between contract clauses and performance (Stevenson and Spring, 2007). This connects 
to the question of whether different clauses instigate different trade‐offs in 
performance (MacCormack and Mishra, 2015). For instance, certain clauses may 
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prioritize cost over time or scope. These trade-offs are at the center of the discourse 
about ‘performance in contract designs’ (Kalkancı et al., 2014) and reveal the major 
dilemmas inherent to how contracts support high OP (MacCormack and Mishra, 2015). 
There is also the view that partners negotiate and align performance expectations 
within the process of contracting (Selviaridis and Spring, 2018) and the contract then 
represents the negotiated mutual expectations. According to Cannon et al. (2000), the 
relational part of the agreement reflects the expectations both partners have of each 
other, which develop as they work together to define mutual goals. This has particular 
importance for the clauses that establish performance, because they are co-
constructed with key stakeholders based on these expectations (Batista et al., 2017). 
Still, their benefits realization in project contracts remains a major under-explored area 
(Zwikael and Meredith, 2018).  
Based on the review of the studies, we summarize in Table 1 the three distinct 
sets of contract clauses, which are discussed in more detail in the next section in order 
to develop the constructs for testing the hypotheses.  
 
2.4 Hypotheses development  
In the following sections we define the independent variables which are three key sets 
of contract clauses (see Table 1) before positioning the study’s hypotheses.  
 
2.4.1 Classical contract clauses 
The literature on classical contract clauses is the largest of the three. Moreover, a large 
number of clauses exists as an outcome of the risk-averse approach of classical 
contracting, which produces very detailed, situation specific clauses; this increases their 
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number, as several probabilities need to be covered in any situation (Williamson, 1999). 
Several articles have grouped clauses into sets according to their roles in the 
transactions. There are four groups of classical clauses (Table 1): (i) action-based 
clauses-accountability, monitoring, evaluation, and performance standards (time, cost 
and scope); (ii) property rights (asset specificity/IP; financial obligations, confidentiality 
and exclusivity); (iii) transaction controls-payments, prices, rewards, penalties, and 
liabilities; and (iv) end of transaction-dispute resolution and termination procedures. 
More specifically, the clauses deal with property rights (e.g. Hagedoorn and 
Hesen, 2007), confidentiality (Reuer and Ariño, 2007), service scope and performance 
guarantees (Susarla et al., 2009), task details, roles, responsibilities and monitoring (e.g., 
reporting), assessment and evaluation (Argyres and Mayer, 2007); unilateral early 
termination (Mayer, 2004), risk allocation, enforcement, and supervision costs, penalties 
for underperformance (Ryall and Sampson, 2009), as well as dispute resolution 
(Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; Reuer and Ariño, 2007).  
Prior studies have argued that classical contracts are incomplete (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986). In other words, contract clauses cannot safeguard against opportunism 
and become unnecessarily complex in their effort to do so (Henisz et al. 2012; 
Williamson, 1999). They cannot provide complete information and often feature 
expectation misalignment, as well as a focus on differences, rather than on mutual 
benefits (Zwikael and Meredith, 2018). Moreover, they emphasize penalties as a 
preventative mechanism (Sommer and Loch, 2009) and involve high costs to be 
reworked and rewritten (Howard et al., 2018; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). Because of the 
complexity reached by their sheer number, classical clauses are not conducive to 
flexibility when problem solving is required in situations of contingency, change, and 
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emergence (Vaaland and Håkansson, 2003) and therefore often lead to low 
performance.  
 
2.4 2 Relational contract clauses  
Relational contract clauses are less specific and more general principles and codes of 
conduct that are intended to inspire and guide behaviors (good faith, due diligence, 
non-competition, see Table 1). These clauses act as a kind of relationship blueprint 
(Ryall and Sampson 2009) that facilitates the establishment of norms (Kern and 
Willcocks, 2000). Relational clauses replace their classical counterparts’ risk allocation 
approach with a risk sharing one (Furlotti, 2007), focus on incentives, and play a vital 
role in mitigating concerns and clarifying the partners’ mutual expectations (Puranam 
and Vanneste, 2009). For instance, a clear delineation of the partners’ roles, tasks, and 
responsibilities helps to reduce complexity and to avoid costly misunderstandings 
(Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Argyres et al., 2007). These clauses can further specify 
information procedures, describe the responsibilities of and interactions between 
partners (Susarla et al. 2009), define processes for sharing information, layout external 
constraints and obligations-such as those pertaining to information disclosure and 
interaction with third parties (Reuer and Ariño, 2007), and regulate the roles played by 
boundary-spanners, gatekeepers, or other kinds of mediators between partners 
(Mellewigt et al., 2012). Other relational clauses (see Table 1) include hiring practices 
carried out through non-competing and non-solicitation agreements (Reuer and Ariño, 
2007), or the designation of specific persons as dedicated alliance managers (Ryall and 
Sampson, 2009). Finally, they also include rules for conflict resolution (negotiation, type 
of mediation, and arbitration). 
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Prior studies have argued that relational contract clauses are often vague and 
low in specificity (Sumo et al., 2016). Examples are revision clauses, the doctrine of 
excuse or dispute resolution and arbitration procedures (Scott, 2013). Relational clauses 
do not make many provisions for enforcement or penalties as they depend on non-
legally enforceable extra-contractual mechanisms (such as informal adjustments, trust, 
authority or norms) for the clauses to be enforced (Maylor and Turner, 2017; Furlotti, 
2007; Williamson, 1999). Similarly to classical contracts, relational contracts may in 
practice become highly complex (Remington, 2011), thus leading to issues of contract 
complexity while still enabling partners to act opportunistically (Brandon-Jones and 
Carey, 2011).  
In summary, classical and relational contract clauses have a different focus 
concerning how transactions should be regulated. Taking into consideration the 
argument pertaining to their complementarity discussed in sections 2.1-2.3, the 
following hypothesis is positioned:  
H1: Combinations of classical and relational contract clauses are positively correlated to 
high operational performance. 
 
2.4.3 Associational contract clauses  
Extant studies have addressed an additional set of contract clauses that may help to 
deal with the incompleteness inherent in classical and relational contracts. Following 
Grandori and Furlotti (2006: 7, 11), these contract clauses, which are labeled 
‘associational’, are useful for the design of less complex and more flexible contracts. 
They are high-order, content-free, framing clauses that create a core that functions as a 
constitution (general statement). The core governs the process of adjusting the terms 
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of transactions over time (Grandori, 2010: 359; Grandori and Furlotti, 2009: 86). An 
associational contract uses this ‘core of associational clauses’ and then adds a ‘belt’ of 
supplementary ones. While the core functions as a constitution - a general direction for 
the allocation of decision-making rights and for the commitment (lock-in) of resources 
- the belt contains clauses, which may be either classical or relational or both, that are 
suitable to the situation and to the business relationship (Grandori and Furlotti, 2009: 
96). 
Grandori (2010: 357) suggested what should be the “core” of resource lock-in 
clauses: (i) a specification of which resources should be pooled; (ii) a specification of 
which actors should provide them; (iii) a specification of which rights over resources are 
pooled and which are not - in particular: who owns the committed assets, according to 
what procedures actions and projects are to be selected, and how the rights to residual 
rewards are to be distributed; and (iv) by which mechanisms resources should be 
locked-in while providing exit rights and modes (as distinct from the resources 
committed). Examples of ‘core’ constitutional provisions are: how decision rights are to 
be allocated; which procedures are to be followed in decision-making joint-steering 
committees and their limits and liabilities; and what boundaries are set to limit 
autonomous actions (Grandori and Furlotti, 2009, 2006) (see Table 1). Associational 
clauses support democratic, multi-party decision-making systems (such as work 
cooperatives). They focus on defining the boundaries of the association between the 
partners in times of contingency, without creating extra safeguarding or relational 
rules. Mellewigt et al. (2012) wrote that these clauses are of “the contingency-
adaptability type”, which deals with force majeure (Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; Luo, 
2002), price adjustment, or change procedures (Mayer and Bercovitz, 2008).  
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Until now, these clauses have been the subject of few studies; however, they are 
attracting increasing attention because modern partnerships are becoming more 
unstable and contingent on dynamically changing environments. Mellewigt et al. (2012) 
noted that associational clauses have an effect on relational ones when combined. 
Similarly, Luo (2002) stated that associational clauses might even combine with others 
as an outcome of learning (Argyres et al., 2007). These arguments lead to the second 
hypothesis: 
H2: Combinations of associational and relational contract clauses are positively 
correlated to high operational performance. 
 
3. Method 
3.1 Multiple methods for cross-validation 
A combination of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), regression analysis, and 
simulation was used to cross-validate the findings. Given the novelty of testing 
combinations of independent variables based on cases, this study needed a research 
design that was positioned ‘mid-way’ between a purely deductive variable-oriented 
one and a purely inductive case-based one (Fiss, 2011). Fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA) was best suited for this type of research as it integrates 
the strengths of the variable and case-based approaches (Ragin, 2008), thus enabling 
the exploration of causal configurations in empirical cases.  
FsQCA was deployed for the main analysis for three reasons. First, because it 
examines how different combinations of causal factors (independent variables) 
correlate with the outcome (in this case, operational performance). While regression 
analysis can isolate the effect of individual factors, fsQCA captures equifinality, which 
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enables the testing of all combinations associated with the outcome (Blackman et al., 
2011). Second, because, whilst methods such as cluster analysis and deviation scores 
can detect distinct sets of clauses, they do not explain how these work together (Fiss, 
2011). In contrast, fsQCA retains sensitivity to the nature of the relations between 
variables (i.e., complementarity and substitution) (Byrne and Ragin, 2009). Third, 
because fsQCA provides reliable results for small-to-medium sized samples (10–50 
cases) (Misangyi et al., 2017; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).  
In addition, fuzzy set analysis suits the study’s context and data in two ways. 
First, unlike in crisp sets, the membership of a variable in a set can be expressed in 
degrees, which is especially useful for our hypotheses and data. This is because the 
question of what constitutes a ‘combination of clauses’ and ‘effect on performance’ 
does not have a yes or no answer. The theoretical direction is that most contracts use a 
variety of clauses in different proportions; thus, binary scores of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in relation 
to the presence of clauses and of their effects on the outcome will not reveal much. To 
test our hypotheses in a meaningful way, the independent variables’ degrees of set-
membership and of effect on outcome needed to be scored. In addition, the data came 
from contracts and interviews and thus constituted an archive of social data that 
required nuanced measurement in degrees. Second, fuzzy-set analysis enables the 
accurate testing of explicit hypotheses, while the crisp-set form is more attuned to 
exploratory analysis through more general and vague propositions. The fsQCA method 
restricts the analysis of necessity to the essential deductive testing of previously 
defined factors or theoretically disjunctions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). This 
enables the testing of predefined expectations on necessary variables or disjunctions of 
variables.  
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In brief, the fsQCA approach matched the nature of the research question, the 
data, and the context. However, because the sample was medium-sized, assessments 
were needed to ensure reliability and to double-check the correlations. This is why 
multiple regression and simulation were used to check the robustness of the fsQCA 
analyses and to ensure a sufficient grasp of the details at the root level (Rohlfing, 2016). 
Specifically, multiple regression, fsQCA, and simulation were used in a complementary 
fashion - which was made possible by these methods’ different (linear/set-case based) 
assumptions (Misangyi et al., 2017) - in a mixed-method research design (Rohlfing, 
2016). In addition, imperfect case knowledge made simulation appropriate for the 
evaluation of fsQCA as, in such situations, simulation provides a general and balanced 
picture of the sensitivity of fsQCA to modeling decisions or to data-related features 
(Rohlfing, 2016; Marx and Dusa, 2011). In addition, simulation has been used before to 
assess whether or not a configuration is significant (Skaaning, 2011). To summarize, the 
benefit of combining fsQCA with multiple regression and simulation is that it provides 
a holistic picture of the validity of QCA results through cross-validation (Fiss, 2011), and 
enables the detection of potential difficulties or inefficiencies linked to sample size and 
correlational inferences. 
 
3.2 Data collection  
FsQCA is optimally positioned to compare variables from multiple cases that share 
characteristics while also presenting a few background differences (Rihoux and Ragin, 
2009: 24-25). Hence, the projects selected for our sample had to have the following 
similarities: (i) they needed to be large scale projects with multiple and diverse partners; 
(ii) the project partnerships had to be between one buyer/sponsor and multiple 
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suppliers/contractors; (iii) they had to be controlled by a national or supranational 
public-sector buyer or sponsor; (iv) they had to feature similarly high levels of 
dependency of the contractors upon the buyer/sponsor; and (v) the contractors had to 
be subject to tendering, selection, and monitoring control procedures and legislation. 
Based on the similarity criteria, 45 multi-partner projects were selected: (i) two 
UK Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects; (ii) three European Public Health projects 
(EARSS); (iii) 14 ICT/eTen Health Framework projects; and (iv) 26 international 
healthcare projects offering healthcare relief in disaster conditions (e.g. earthquakes 
and floods). 
Overall, 98 semi-structured interviews were conducted involving a common set 
of questions with senior managers, professional sub-contractors (e.g., medical, 
technical) and key suppliers (for background details please see Appendix 2 and 3). The 
timing of the interviews varied from 45 minutes to four hours, depending on the 
number of people interviewed and on the level of detail of the information provided by 
each interviewee. The number of interviews per project varied according to the number 
of partners involved in each partnership (for instance, PPP projects had dozens of 
partners, and hence more interviews were required). Each investigated project involved 
public and private partners. The interviewees were chosen through purposive sampling: 
the key individuals interviewed had been involved in writing and operationalizing the 
contracts, held managerial positions within the projects and had knowledge of the 
outcomes. To gain a dyadic perspective, efforts were made to ensure consistency in 
interviewing all key parties in each contract. The interviewers followed a semi-
structured interview guide and most interviews were conducted between a single 
interviewer and a single interviewee. In a few cases, two interviewers were present. 
20 
 
Projects are usually assessed in terms of cost, time, and scope, and the interviewed 
managers were all well trained in and familiar with this type of assessment and were 
able to talk about performance. The interviewees understood and described the 
contract parts and processes and the types of clauses. They did not have any objections 
in relation to the types of contract clauses and to the types of agreements (further 
information is provided in Appendix 3). The semi-structured interview data were also 
triangulated with secondary data (e.g. independent reports about the projects) to 
ensure that objective OP measurements were obtained.  
 
3.3 Measures, coding and checking for heterogeneity 
Fuzzy sets allow for degrees of membership of categories. They record a value of 1 for 
full membership of a set, zero for total non-membership, and a fuzzy score ranging 
between the two extremes for any intermediate degree of membership - the point of 
maximum ambiguity. A fuzzy score of 0.75 might mean, for example, that an element is 
‘mostly in’ the set. Fuzzy scores were used (Table 2) to assign a value to each set of 
clauses in each contract. According to these scores, full membership (1) means that all 
of the clauses of a particular type were present in the contract. Coincidence with non-
membership (0) of another type would have meant that this case was a purely 
relational or purely classical contract (which did not happen in this study). Below are 
the membership measures for the independent and dependent variables. 
<Please insert Table 2 here> 
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3.3.1 Measuring the clauses 
The constructs for the independent variables are based on the sets of clauses in Table 
1. There are three sets of clauses — classical, relational and associational. A four fuzzy 
score–scale (Ragin, 2008: 31, see Table 2 upper box) was chosen to measure each set of 
clauses by scoring the frequency of their use in the contracts—as taken from the 
contract templates. The fuzzy scale had values that ranged from full membership to 
non-membership: most frequent (1 = full membership); mostly frequent (0.67 = mostly 
in); the crossover point (0.50 = ambiguous membership); less frequent (0.33 = mostly 
out), and non-frequent (0 = full non-membership) (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Ragin, 
2008).   
 
3.3.2 Measuring the outcome (operational performance) 
The dependent variable for OP consists of the Iron Triangle construct, which consists of 
three performance measures (time, cost, and scope). This has been widely adopted and 
used to measure project performance both in academic studies and in practice across 
different project industries (e.g. construction, engineering, healthcare, and information 
technology) (Ika, 2009). These three performance measures are consistently present in 
different types of project contracts (Serrador and Turner, 2015). To preserve 
consistency in measurement, OP was therefore assessed in terms of time, cost, and 
scope. Time-based indicators were used, including deliveries on project completion 
time, timely communication, and coordination, cost-based indicators such as 
operations, purchase, financial, and transportation costs, and scope-based indicators in 
the form of satisfaction of project aims and of stakeholder expectations. The OP of 
each project was evaluated in terms of the average of these three indicators measured 
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on a three-value fuzzy scale (Ragin, 2008: 31; Table 2), based on the data pertaining to 
performance collected via interviews and secondary data.  
The values on the fuzzy scale chosen to measure OP were as follows (Table 2, 
lower box): (i) Highly successful with little or no problems, change or renegotiations (1= 
full membership). In other words, the contracts were sufficient and there were no 
changes in terms of cost, time, or scope; (ii) A vague situation with several problems 
and some renegotiations in relation to any of the three performance criteria, which, 
however, did not lead to complete rewrite or collapse (0.50 = ambiguous 
membership).; (iii) Low performance or not successful, referring to situations in which 
parts of the contract had not been fulfilled (0 = full non-membership) (Rihoux and 
Ragin, 2009; Ragin, 2008).   
 
3.3.3 Coding  
The following steps were followed to code the data according to the measures 
described in the previous section:  
1. Each contract was examined and the numbers of clauses in each set used in it 
were scored (based on the sets in Table 1].   
2. Fuzzy scores were used (Table 2) to assign a value to each set of clauses in each 
contract. We also ensured inter-coder reliability. The inter-coder reliability 
analyses were conducted for the underlying items and the alpha values ranged 
from 0.96 to 0.98, demonstrating a high degree of agreement between coders 
(Compton et al., 2012). 
3. The interview answers pertaining to the clauses and OP of each project were 
analyzed. Fuzzy scores were used to assign a value for OP to each project.  
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4. All the scores were recorded in a project coding Table (in Appendix 4) that was 
then analyzed.  
After the scores from the interviews had been collected, the raw values for each 
variable were coded in the project coding Table (Appendix 4) according to the fuzzy-
scale (Table 2). Any interview input that referred to performance in terms of time, cost, 
and scope in the transcripts was underlined with a score, according to the fuzzy-scale, 
and coded in the project coding table as a raw value. The process was standardized (a 
few examples were initially jointly coded) so that there would be no disagreement 
about the scores when they were crosschecked independently. After the scores from 
the contract templates were collected, the raw values were coded for each variable in 
the project coding table.  
 
3.3.4 Heterogeneity and checks 
As shown in Table 3, no significant heterogeneity was found between the cases. A 
mean difference test was conducted to check whether there were any differences in the 
variable mean values; disaster relief projects (N = 26) versus other category of projects 
(N = 19). The relative mean (x) and standard deviation (σ) values were not very 
different, and this was supported by our t-test, which showed no significant differences 
(p < 0.05) in any of the variables used in further analyses to test the hypotheses. 
Additionally, a chi-square difference test was conducted in order to check whether the 
groups were different; they were not significantly so, with the chi-square difference 
being 1.99 and 3 degrees of freedom. Regarding path levels, both groups produced 
significant path coefficients. The path coefficients for disaster relief-based projects were 
β = - 0.46, β = 0.27, and β = 0.30 for classical, relational, and association clauses 
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respectively. In a similar sequence for three clauses, the path coefficients for the other 
group were β = - 0.52, β = 0.31, and β = 0.30. The relative coefficients were more or 
less similar and consequently supported the chi-square test results. Also, the control 
variables such as the number of partners, years of contracting, value, and number of 
partners interviewed were insignificant. 
<Please insert Table 3 here> 
 
3.4 The analysis procedure  
The fsQCA analysis procedure, based on that developed by Ragin (1987), is shown in 
Figure 1 at the end of this section. First, the models that would be tested for each 
hypothesis were decided upon. Then, the cases that shared the appropriate 
characteristics were selected and the data collection protocol was built (see interview 
Table in Appendix 2). Finally, after coding the variables (as above) and preparing the 
project coding Table (Appendix 4), consistency and calibration thresholds were chosen 
for each variable according to the indirect cluster method (Thiem and Dusa, 2012: 54-
58).  
This calibration method was chosen because it enables the thresholds to be 
decided based on the clustering of the values of each variable by means of a procedure 
first introduced by Ragin (2008). The indirect method assumes a vector of thresholds 
that cuts the original data into equal intervals and then the application of a 
(quasi)binomial logistic regression with a fractional polynomial equation. This method 
gives calibration values that are more representative of the trends within the data, 
rather than directly setting a ‘most likely’ calibration threshold. Before the analysis 
could be undertaken, the calibrated table (Appendix 4) had to be confirmed with 
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regression and simulation tests. With proper values verified, the next step was to test 
these values in two ways: first for necessary and then for sufficient combinations, with a 
minimum consistency of 0.75 and inclusion of 0.60 (the values suggested for reliable 
results by Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).  
FsQCA uses two types of tools for testing hypotheses—necessity and 
sufficiency—that are conceptualized in set-theoretic terms. Whenever a causal factor is 
necessary (but not sufficient) for an outcome, the instances of the outcome form a 
subset of those of the causal factor. A necessary factor is a cause that must be present 
for the outcome to occur all or most of the time. Although its presence does not mean 
that the outcome will occur, its absence means that the outcome will not occur all or 
most of the time. A sufficient factor is one which, when present, ensures that the 
outcome will occur all or most of the time. Whenever a casual condition is sufficient 
(but not necessary) to an outcome, the instances of the causal condition form a subset 
of those of the outcome. Like necessary factors, sufficient ones are not absolute.  
There are two measures suited to assess the goodness-of-fit of both necessary 
and sufficient tests-consistency and coverage-which are measured on a range from 0.0-
1.0. Consistency measures the strength of the test. A score of 1.0 indicates that, 
whenever the outcome is present, the necessary variable is too. Scores of less than 1.0 
indicate a corresponding degree of inconsistency. For example, a score of 0.95 would 
show that whenever the outcome is present, the factor is "almost always" present. A 
generally accepted rule-of-thumb is that necessity and sufficiency are indicated when 
consistency is equal to or greater than 0.75, but not otherwise. 
A coverage score of 1.0 indicates that whenever the necessary variable is 
present, the outcome is present. Coverage scores are an indication of the empirical 
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relevance of a configuration of variables to the cases; this, in turn, can be understood 
as being an indicator of its importance. Regarding the coverage of configurations, the 
lower its score, the less empirically relevant a causal configuration is. That means, it is 
able to explain fewer cases in which the outcome occurred. The generally accepted 
rule-of-thumb is that coverage score should not be lower than 0.5 (Ragin, 2008).  
The necessity tests were performed first, followed by the sufficiency ones. When 
testing for sufficiency, a truth table is constructed to show the scores of all possible 
combinations plus single variables. The table has 2n rows, where n equals the number 
of independent variables. As there were three independent variables, the truth Table 
(Appendix 5) had 8 tests. Each observation from the dataset was sorted into one row in 
the truth Table, based on its membership scores. A truth table provides a typology, 
grouping similar observations together, and the rows of the truth table are called 
configurations. 
A truth table goes through a procedure, called minimization, for which there are 
three outcomes: ‘complex solution’, ‘intermediate solution’, and ‘parsimonious solution’ 
(Ragin, 2008). These represent different levels of simplification ranging from most 
conservative (complex) to most aggressive (parsimonious). Parsimonious expressions 
retain all complexity in data; they are simply those rows of the truth table where the 
outcome equals 1, including configurations that are not linked to observations. 
Complex solutions, on the other hand, remove all the outcomes that are ambiguous. 
Parsimonious solutions are often overly simplistic, but can provide the lowest level of 
causal complexity generated by reanalyzing the truth table with the set of ‘remainder’ 
rows (combinations lacking good instances). Ragin and Sonnett (2005) stated that 
‘complex’ (or detailed) solutions eliminate all logical remainders, which are 
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“combinations of causal factors that lack empirical instances” (Ragin, 2008: 155). 
Intermediate solutions are based on carefully justified counterfactual arguments 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; Ragin, 2008). All three tests were conducted and 
then all three solutions were observed to evaluate the outcome. In this case, the results 
were then validated by means of multiple regression and simulation tests.  
<Please insert Figure 1 here> 
 
4. Results 
4. 1 Descriptive statistics and quality checks 
First, the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix produced for the sets of clauses 
are presented in Table 4. The calibrations produced mean values for the clauses 
ranging from 0.36 to 0.61, thus showing good close ranges that may result in 
significant associations. The matrix provides an indication of the significant correlation 
that exists between clauses and high OP, with all values being significant at p < 0.01. 
Specifically, relational and associational clauses are strongly positively correlated both 
with OP and with each other, whilst classical clauses show inverse relations with all the 
other variables. 
<Please insert Table 4 here> 
 
4.2 The fsQCA results and hypotheses validation 
The necessity tests are shown in Table 5. Hypothesis 1 posits that classical and 
relational clauses combine in complementary ways to realize high OP. This hypothesis 
is not supported, as models 1, 4, 5, and 7 show that classical clauses are not 
complementary to relational ones, but that associational clauses appear to take their 
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place instead. Hypothesis 2 speculates that relational and associational clauses are 
positively related to high OP and, consequently, that they may combine in 
complementary ways (i.e., moderating) to realize high OP. This hypothesis is addressed 
in two parts. First, whether both clauses are positively related to high OP. Models 2 and 
3 support the former statement, and models 6 and 7 support the latter. Second, as can 
be seen in table 5 (i.e., sufficiency results and models), Hypothesis 1 is again not 
supported, whilst hypothesis 2 is corroborated. Three solutions (complex, intermediate 
and parsimonious) that provide proof against our hypotheses are presented. These 
represent combinations that are sufficient for the outcome to occur, each being based 
on different assumptions and each presenting specific differentiating characteristics as 
follows. The complex solution is the most conservative, as it does not allow for logical 
remainders and assumptions to be included. The intermediate solution incorporates 
only ‘easy’ counterfactuals, and is the simplest to interpret. The parsimonious solution 
allows all counterfactuals, both ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ ones. The reason why all three 
solutions are used here is that they can corroborate or falsify each other, as suggested 
by Ragin (2008). The complex solution shows a prominent combination (~classical * 
RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL) that also corroborates the result found in the 
necessity test. Classical and relational clauses substitute one another (take each other’s 
place), whilst relational and associational clauses combine in complementary ways 
(RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL). The associational clauses alone (based on the 
intermediate solution) also depict strong evidence of high OP. Moreover, the 
combinations correlate with high OP with a very high level of consistency (> 0.90). 
<Please insert Table 5 here> 
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4.3 Multiple regression and simulation results for hypotheses cross-validation 
Table 6 provides a summary of the regression results. The final models (i.e., ~classical; 
classical * RELATIONAL, ~classical * RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL) for Hypothesis 1 
(i.e., the combination of classical and relational clauses complementing each other and 
being positively correlated with high OP) and the models (RELATIONAL; 
ASSOCIATIONAL; RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL) for Hypothesis 2 (i.e., the 
combination of associational and relational clauses being positively correlated with 
high OP) were cross-validated through multiple regression and simulation. The 
regression analysis revealed that classical clauses negatively affect high OP, with β = - 
0.50, t-value = - 5.16 and p = 0.000. Relational and associational clauses positively 
affect OP (β = 0.27, t-value = 3.52 and p = 0.001 for relational clauses and β = 0.29, t-
value = 2.81 and p = 0.008 for associational ones; R2 = 82% and adjusted-R2 = 81%). 
The moderation results for Hypothesis 1 are not supported. The interactions of 
~classical * RELATIONAL and ~classical * RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL show 
negative effects, with β = - 0.65, t-value = - 5.90 and p = 0.00; β = - 0.24, t-value = - 
2.10 and p = 0.04 respectively. This enables to conclude that classical clauses do not 
complement or that combinations of classical and relational classes are not positively 
correlated with high OP. 
Hypothesis 2 posits that combinations of associational clauses with relational 
ones are positively correlated to high OP, and is supported with β = 0.60, t-value = 8.89 
and p < 0.001. Additionally, no multi-collinearity issues were found. The collinearity 
tolerance values were greater than 0.40, which are well above the cut-off criterion of 
0.20. Specifically, the values for classical, relational and associational clauses were 0.46, 
0.73 and 0.41, respectively. Moreover, the variance inflation factors were 2.16, 1.37 and 
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2.44, which are substantially lower than the recommended cut-off criterion of 10 
(Dormann, 2013; O’Brien, 2007).  
<Please insert Table 6 here> 
The simulation analysis with n = 320 produced similar outcomes for the main 
contract clauses: classical (β = - 0.43 and t-value = - 8.55), relational (β = 0.16 and t-
value = 3.070) and associational (β = 0.33 and t-value = 6.50). Similarly, the moderation 
results were corroborated and support Hypothesis 1 (~classical * RELATIONAL * 
ASSOCIATIONAL, β = - 0.27 and t-value = - 4.68) and Hypothesis 2 (RELATIONAL * 
ASSOCIATIONAL, β = 0.53 and t-value = 9.40). All relationships were also found to be 
significant at p < 0.001. This triangulation with the regression and simulation analysis 
provided a comprehensive testing procedure for the models. 
 
5. Discussion 
Project contracts are often incomplete and have serious performance issues. The 
argument that neither classical nor relational contracts are adequate to realize high OP 
was followed. The argument, drawn from contracting theory (e.g. Sumo et al., 2016; 
Wacker et al., 2016; Caldwell and Howard, 2014; Hartmann et al., 2014; Kalkancı et al., 
2014; Smith and King, 2009), that classical and relational contracts should be combined 
in order to overcome incompleteness and achieve high OP was also adopted. This 
study has elaborated upon the theoretical framework of contractual incompleteness by 
testing combinations of three contract clauses to find which ones drive high OP.  
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5.1 Theoretical implications  
This study contributes to the theory of contractual complementarity, specifically in the 
context of project contracting. The analysis produced two theoretical implications: first, 
that relational and classical contract clauses in project contracts are not 
complementary; and second, that more complete project contracts are created when 
combining relational with associational contract clauses that complement each other.  
First theoretical implication - The results have shown that combinations of 
classical and relational contract clauses do not lead to high OP and act as substitutes; 
this may be attributed to the characteristics of projects, which are different from other 
types of operations. In contrast to prior research that investigated incompleteness, the 
results of this study show that project stakeholder and supply chain relationships do 
not share the characteristics found in long-term inter-organizational relationships of 
operations organizations (Curlee and Gordon, 2011; Oltra et al., 2005; Davies and 
Brady, 2000). Specifically, projects are temporary organizational forms that are subject 
to stringent time pressures, to difficulties in establishing relational mechanisms (trust, 
authority, norms), and to high levels of change and contingency. Often, project 
relationships are highly adversarial, and trust between partners needs to be built 
swiftly. Projects are characterized by high operational risks and their timeframes are 
often unstable (Gil, 2009; Skaates et al., 2002).  
Therefore, the findings may be partly explained by the temporary nature of 
project relationships, which often cease when projects finish. Thus, a partner may not 
be more incentivized to share risks as they may not be in a repeating long-term 
business relationship. There is also insufficient time to develop strong norms and 
strong authority patterns, making coordination more difficult. Coordination therefore 
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demands that partners retain a high degree of flexibility to handle change. However, 
classical clauses, which are designed to bring stability and control in a transaction, run 
contrary to the need to manage change often. Extant studies that have focused on 
project contracts and partnerships have found that partners who constantly deal with 
changes in project plans are faced with high rates of litigation between contractors, 
and very often fail in achieving cost, time, and/or specification performance targets 
(e.g., Roehrich and Lewis, 2012; Zheng et al., 2008). On the other hand, relational 
contract clauses are weak because of the lack of extra-contractual mechanisms that 
could reinforce the agreement, as discussed above. It seems that, when these two types 
of contract clauses are combined in project contracts, they do not complement each 
other’s virtues but, rather, enhance each other’s weaknesses, therefore not leading to 
high OP. 
Second theoretical implication - The results show a second theoretical 
contribution - namely, that associational and relational contract clauses have 
complementary effects and are both substitutes to classical contract clauses. 
Relationships in projects are characterized by shorter time-spans, less capacity for 
control, and higher risk; thus, they require higher operational flexibility. Because of the 
above, relationships in projects are often more susceptible to contingencies and risk 
than those found in other types of operations (Gil, 2009; Skaates et al., 2002). These 
higher levels of contingency and risk, in turn, add higher pressure for operational 
flexibility. The results of hypothesis 2 show that associational contract clauses provide 
the flexibility required (Mellewigt et al., 2012), playing a significant role in project 
contracts by supporting relational contract clauses in the development of better 
coordination (Remington, 2011). In order to counteract some of their limitations and to 
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realize high OP, relational contract clauses - which are often vague and low in 
specificity (Sumo et al., 2016) - can be combined with associational contract clauses. 
In this sense, the combination of relational and associational contract clauses 
can counteract the inefficiencies inherent in relational contracting (Winch, 2010). This 
result shows a possible connection with risk and devolution in contract clauses, which 
links to the capability to adapt decision-making in risky environments. The result is that 
project contracts should adopt associational contract clauses in which a ‘core’ of 
flexible decision processes is complemented by a ‘belt’ of mainly relational contract 
clauses.  
 
5.2 Further research  
Whilst this study offers promising findings, it does, however, have t limitations: First, it 
has a single sector focus (the sample projects dealt with several aspects of healthcare 
services), and second, it draws its data from a medium-sized sample. Nevertheless, this 
study’s research design can be replicated in other settings (different industries and 
types of projects) and the results could increase the generalizability of and build on its 
findings. Regarding sample size, QCA is applicable to both small/medium and large 
samples. However, it is important to cross-validate the results with other techniques.  
As the emerging body of literature on how contracts and contract clauses can 
be combined grows, the findings present manifold future research opportunities. 
Further research should test the relationship between operational flexibility and the 
combination of associational with relational contract clauses. This line of research could 
investigate how best to address the problem of operational flexibility in projects. 
Flexibility has strong links to risk, uncertainty, and complexity stemming from both the 
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project environment and contracts. Future studies need to perform multivariate 
analysis of the complex relationship between contracts, flexibility and high OP. 
Also, it is not enough that contracting partners know which contract clauses to 
use. Further studies could investigate the degrees of influence and impact that different 
types of risk and temporality have on the effectiveness and structure of project 
contracts in relation to decision-making (Cannon et al., 2000). This would be a test of 
the moderation effects of risk and complexity on the relationship between contracts 
and high OP. Future work on contracting cannot offer solutions to contractual 
incompleteness unless more nuanced studies test multiple combinations of contract 
clauses. For example, future research efforts may want to investigate which 
combinations of core or belt contract clauses (from Table 1) exhibit the highest 
complementary effects. Finally, future research may also investigate power between 
different contracting partners and how power influences the combination of contract 
clauses and their impact OP.  
 
5.3 Managerial implications  
The managerial implications of this study include a more thorough understanding of 
the use of contract clauses. Contracting in projects has been a fundamental, but 
problematic, area for managers and policymakers, who continue to struggle to achieve 
high performance in terms of time, cost, and scope. The findings present implications 
for those project managers who seek to overcome the effects of contract 
incompleteness when governing various project relationships. The development of a 
more complete - or, at least, less ineffective - contract entails the understanding of how 
to customize contract clauses to elicit adaptive reactions in future contingencies.  
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Moreover, managers often adopt classical contracts as their preference lies 
towards risk avoidance by means of penalty clauses. With project transactions changing 
over time, managers are required to adopt a more flexible approach to solve 
operational problems. Different combinations of contract clauses can help to tackle 
different operational changes. For instance, when purchasing requirements or inventory 
levels change, the use of associational clauses related to resource acquisition could be 
useful to realize OP. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The study contributes to two research areas: (i) the theory of contractual 
incompleteness and complementarity; and (ii) project contracting. Hypotheses 
pertaining to combinations of classical, relational, and associational contract clauses 
were derived from theory and tested on data collected from 45 projects. The results 
have shown that high operational performance is achieved when relational and 
associational contract clauses are combined. Moreover, classical and relational contract 
clauses are substitutes in project contracts when realizing high OP and, hence, should 
not be combined. The study’s key implication is that theory in contractual 
incompleteness with regards to project contracts should be directed towards 
combinations that include associational contract clauses. This study has increased our 
understanding of contractual incompleteness and complementarity and of how it 
relates to operational performance in projects.  
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